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AI Agent Policy Desk

Audit coding agent configs, build the managed policy, and prove what it blocks.

Background readingMCP tool poisoningPrompt injection attacksLeast privilege

Loading the checks.

Steps

Covers Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and MCP server files. Fernhill Studio is a fictional fleet and every token in the samples is fake.

What it checks

What it checks, and how far to trust it

Setting names and defaults were checked against the Claude Code, Codex and Cursor documentation on 10 November 2026. Both CLIs ship often, so recheck before a rollout.

FileChecksWhat gets flagged
Claude Code settings33Bypass mode and no lock against it, unscoped Bash, interpreter and network prefixes, unscoped WebFetch, server-wide MCP approval, 11 unprotected secret paths (SSH, cloud, wallet keystores, npm, Docker, Kubernetes), absolute paths written with one slash, repo MCP servers that auto-start, secrets and TLS switched off in env, hooks that pipe the internet into a shell, sandbox that fails open or has broad escape hatches, Read denies that scripts can step around, no login or organisation lock, allowManagedPermissionRulesOnly placed under permissions where it is ignored
Codex config.toml15danger-full-access with approval never (the --yolo combination), network inside the sandbox, home folder as a writable root or trusted project, secret-named variables passed to commands (ignore_default_excludes defaults to true), the retired "untrusted" and deprecated "on-failure" values, permission profiles with full access, custom profiles that write the whole filesystem or home folder, open the network or use dangerously_* network flags, secrets written into shell_environment_policy.set
Cursor permissions7Wildcard or interpreter commands in the auto-run list, WebFetch(*), Mcp(*:*), writes outside or across the whole workspace, no secret Read denies
MCP servers (any of the above)4Unpinned npx, uvx or bunx packages, containers with the Docker socket or privileged mode, remote servers over plain HTTP, tokens pasted into env, headers or arguments

AI Agent Policy Desk FAQ

Which files can I paste?

A Claude Code settings.json or managed-settings.json, a project .mcp.json, a Codex config.toml, and a Cursor cli-config.json or permissions.json. The type is detected from the content.

Which shell commands do Read deny rules cover?

Read and Edit deny rules cover the file tools, file commands Claude Code recognises in Bash such as cat, head, tail, sed and tee, and redirect targets. They do not cover a script that opens the file itself, such as Python or Node, or a grep -r that never names the file. The OS sandbox enforces the path for every process on macOS, Linux and WSL2, but not on native Windows.

Where does the managed settings file go?

On macOS, /Library/Application Support/ClaudeCode/managed-settings.json or a configuration profile for the com.anthropic.claudecode domain. On Linux and WSL, /etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json. On Windows, C:\Program Files\ClaudeCode\managed-settings.json or the HKLM policy key. Codex requirements go to /etc/codex/requirements.toml.

Is the permission tester exact?

No. It is an approximate model of the documented rules and is not Claude Code's own shell parser. It follows the documented order (deny, then ask, then allow, then the mode), splits chained commands, checks deny rules inside substitutions and loops, and sends commands it cannot parse, and paths it cannot resolve, to a prompt. Unsupported command semantics can still produce a wrong answer. Confirm a policy on one test machine before a fleet rollout.

Is my config uploaded?

No. Your config is processed in your browser: parsing, checks, the policy builder and the tester all run on the page. Secrets it detects are masked in the findings on a best-effort basis, so use synthetic or already-redacted configs.

Sources

Fernhill Studio, its laptops and every token in the samples are invented. Your config is processed in your browser.