Great Firewall Check
Whether China's SNI filter cuts a hostname, tested from outside, beside OONI's in-country results.
Background readingThe Great FirewallThe TLS handshakeDNS spoofing
Enter a hostname. Our server sends one TLS handshake naming it to each of several mainland web servers, after checking that a random name gets through and a known-blocked name gets cut on that path.
How the check works
The Great Firewall inspects traffic in both directions at China's border. When a browser opens an HTTPS connection, the first message it sends (the ClientHello) names the site in plain text, in a field called SNI. If that name is on the firewall's list, the connection is torn down before the handshake can finish. The same happens to a handshake travelling into China from abroad, which is what lets this check run from our server.
- Vantage servers. Public web front ends of large Chinese sites (JD, Taobao, NetEase, Sohu, Bilibili, Zhihu), looked up through a Beijing client subnet so the address is a mainland server. The list refreshes every few hours.
- Calibration. Every 30 minutes each server gets a handshake naming a random hostname, which must complete, and one naming www.wikipedia.org, which must be cut. Only servers that pass both vote. A server that rejects unknown names, or a path that stopped crossing the filter, drops out instead of producing a wrong answer.
- The test. One handshake per voting server, with your hostname as the SNI. Completed, refused by the server, cut, or timed out is recorded for each.
- QUIC. HTTP/3 has its own filter and its own list: since April 2024 the firewall decrypts the first QUIC packet and drops the rest of the flow when the name is listed. A second set of mainland servers that speak HTTP/3 gets a QUIC Initial naming a random host, which must be answered, then one naming www.google.com or www.youtube.com, which must go silent. Each packet leaves from a new source port. On 17 Nov 2026 every server answered both names, so QUIC filtering of traffic from abroad is marked not observable.
- DNS. A DNS query for www.google.com goes to a mainland server that runs no DNS. Any answer would be forged on the path. When none comes back, DNS poisoning is marked as not observable from our server.
- In-country data. The page also asks OONI, where volunteers inside China test sites directly, for the last 90 days of measurements of the same hostname.
How to read the result
- On the SNI filter (red): every voting server cut the handshake. Plain HTTPS to this name will fail in China.
- Filtered on some networks (amber): some servers cut it and some completed. Filtering varies by network and the firewall misses some connections, so treat this as blocked for planning.
- Not on the SNI filter (green): every voting server completed. The site can still be blocked inside China by IP, DNS or HTTP filtering, which this check cannot see. Measured on 13 Nov 2026, twitter.com and facebook.com pass here and are blocked in China. The OONI panel is the better guide to whether a site loads.
- No verdict (grey): no server passed calibration, or every probe timed out.
- QUIC row: silent on every voting server means HTTP/3 to the name fails; browsers then fall back to TLS, so the TLS verdict decides whether the site loads over HTTPS.
Great Firewall check FAQ
How can a test run from outside China see the Great Firewall?
The firewall inspects traffic in both directions at China's border. A TLS handshake our server sends to a server inside China crosses it, and when the hostname in that handshake is on the SNI blocklist the connection is cut before the handshake finishes.
The check says clear. Will the site load in China?
Not necessarily. This check sees only the SNI filter. Many sites, including twitter.com and facebook.com, pass it and are still blocked inside China by IP blocking, DNS poisoning or HTTP filtering. Read the OONI panel beside it, which comes from volunteers testing inside China.
Why do some mainland servers disagree?
Filtering differs between networks and provinces, and the firewall does not cut every connection it should. Each server votes separately, so a split result means the name is filtered on some paths.
Why is there no DNS poisoning result?
Before each run the tool sends a DNS query for a known-poisoned name to a mainland server that runs no DNS. When no forged answer comes back, DNS poisoning cannot be seen from our server, and the page says so instead of reporting a clean result.
Why does QUIC say not observable?
The firewall blocked QUIC by SNI in both directions from April 2024, and researchers reported the incoming direction stopped in 2025. On 17 Nov 2026 mainland servers answered our QUIC packets naming www.google.com and www.youtube.com. A clean result would then mean nothing, so the page gives no QUIC verdict until a known-blocked name goes silent again.
Which servers receive the test traffic?
A fixed handful of public web front ends of large Chinese sites, found through a Beijing client subnet. You choose only the hostname inside the handshake. Each server gets one handshake per check, and results are cached for 15 minutes per hostname.
Live handshakes from the pwnsy VPN API at vpn.pwnsy.com; in-country measurements from OONI; vantage servers located through dns.google. Method after GFW Report.